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SUPPLEMENTARY PENSIONS IN THE SINGLE
MARKET: THE COMMISSION VIEW
Paolo Clarottit
The provision of pensions is a fundamental aspect of social
protection in the European Union. As of today, state pension
arrangements are still, by far, the most important pension
providers.
However the demographic changes which have already
occurred over the last 30 years, and those which are expected
in the future (up to 2030), will have dramatic budgetary
implications on such arrangements and will make them
practically impossible to continue for long. That is why the
European Commission is developing a number of ideas relating
to certain aspects of supplementary pension provision, in order
to cope with this new situation which is emerging relatively
rapidly.
Currently, there are four people of working age to support
each pensioner in the E.U. By 2030, there will be two. This
prediction is the result of greater longevity and the decline in
birth rates in Europe. This phenomenon is not confined to the
E.U. but is also found to a greater or lesser extent in most
developed countries.
Statutory state pensions in the E.U. are mostly paid by
the state out of current revenues ("pay as you go"). There are
at present no earmarked investment funds for state pensions.
If current policies toward pensions are not changed, there will
be an inevitable increase in state spending on pensions to pay
for the increased number of pensioners.
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Several member states have already initiated reforms to
ensure the sustainability of state pension provisions. The need
to maintain levels of income in retirement is likely to result in
greater reliance being placed on other sources of
supplementary retirement income: 1) pension schemes linked
to employment (pillar 2) and 2) pension schemes taken out by
individuals, usually with life insurance companies (pillar 3).
The Commission clearly recognises that policies in relation
to pillar 2 and 3 supplementary pension schemes are by no
means a panacea for the difficulties which demographic change
is expected to bring. Member states' Social Security systems
will continue to provide the bulk of pension payouts, with the
emphasis on social solidarity within and between generations.
However, given the existence and likely growth of funded
supplementary schemes, the Commission has explored in a
Green Paper' how the "single market" can enable these
schemes to operate more efficiently.
The growth in these funds is one of the possible ways of
maintaining the level of retirement income. They present an
opportunity for the E.U. economy; the Green Paper asks how
these benefits can be delivered through the E.U. capital
market, particularly in light of the positive impact of the
introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union ("EMU"). At
present, employment and life assurance linked pension
schemes in most member states invest a large proportion of
their assets in domestic government bonds. In view of the
commitment of member states to financial stability, it is likely
that the capacity for growth in government bonds will be
limited. This means that the supply of equities and private
sector bonds is likely to grow if the increase in available funds
is to be taken up by the E.U. capital market.
This forecast is based on the results of many studies which
have shown that over the long term, equities have tended to
have a higher rate of return than bonds, though this is not
inevitable for the future. The investment strategy of a pension
fund or life insurance company and the portfolio balance
between equities, bonds, real estate and short term placements
are principal determinants of the rate of return on overall
' Supplementary Pensions in the Single Market: Green
Commission to the European Council, COM(97)238 final.
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assets. Because of the greater volatility of equities, any figures
on rates of return are sensitive to the period over which these
returns are measured. In the short term, therefore, equities
could be either outperformed by bonds or go down in value.
Nevertheless, it is believed by some observers that because
higher returns are associated with equities over a long period,
and because pension funds require investment over the long
term, there is scope to increase the rate of return on some E.U.
pension and life assurance funds, which currently hold a high
proportion of government bonds, by increasing the share of
equities in their investment portfolio.
For example, during the period of 1984 through 1993,
there were significant differences in the real rate of return of
E.U. pension funds and life insurance funds-with over 6
percentage points difference between the worst and best
performers. In a funded scheme, returns need to be sufficient
to deal with the effects of salary inflation over the long term.
An increase in the annual rate of return of say two or three
percentage points can make an enormous difference over a
working life and should not be underestimated.
Assume the target is a fixed supplementary pension of 35
percent of an employee's salary on the basis of a 40 year
working life. If the real rate of return on assets is 6 percent,
the cost is 5 percent of salary: all other things being equal, if
the real rate of return is 4 percent, the cost is 10 percent of
salary, and if the real rate of return is only 2 percent, the cost
is 19 percent of salary. At any rate, the impact of the
intervention of pension funds as a supplement to E.U. national
state pension schemes (i.e., the increase in the supply of long
term capital) may transform the E.U. capital market. This
could happen with beneficial effects on E.U. industry and
infrastructure.
It should be stressed, however, that the Commission does
not advocate any particular investment strategy for pension
funds. It is the role of the fund managers to determine the best
investment strategy for the ultimate benefit of pensioners,
subject only to appropriate prudential supervision. The Green
Paper discussed within has merely explored the role the single
market can play in the future to maximise the investment
possibilities of fund managers whilst maintaining adequate
prudential control. It has addressed whether the current rules
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of prudential supervision in some member states are
disproportionate in that they go beyond what is objectively
necessary to ensure the security of funds and at the same time
prevent the development of a real single market in pension
funds for the benefit of pensioners and future pensioners.
Specifically, some of the rules currently imposed by
member states as part of their prudential supervision of these
funds seem to go beyond what is objectively necessary and
prevent freedom of movement of capital in the single market.
Clearly, prudential supervision is required to ensure that
pension funds and life assurance companies can meet their
future pension liabilities. This supervision must not be
weakened. One of the objectives of the Green Paper was to
consider how the security of benefits can be maintained,
removing the current disproportionate restrictions whilst
allowing a real single market in pension funds to develop for
the benefit of pensioners and future pensioners. From the
evidence, it seems that alternative methods of supervision can
provide equivalent security.
Advocates of modern risk management techniques suggest
that such techniques allow managers to control risk while
investing in assets with greater volatility but higher rates of
return. These techniques aim to capture the return from the
risk premium of equity while avoiding excessively high levels
of volatility. In evaluating risk and making asset allocation
decisions, it is more appropriate to focus on the relationship
between assets and liabilities and not solely on assets.
Thus, different pension funds (e.g. young schemes with
many contributions relative to pay-out or old schemes with
large pay-outs relative to contributions) should, in all
likelihood, adopt different investment strategies because their
asset/liability profiles are different. In this way they can
maximise returns at minimum increased risk.
This approach to asset/liability management is the basis of
the "prudent man" management and supervisory technique
used in some member states. They judge the financial viability
of the pension fund or life insurance company by assessing the
match between its financial assets and its liabilities over the
expected life of the scheme, taking into account relevant
considerations such as the type, size, development and rate of
funding of the scheme and the volume and nature of the fund's
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liabilities. When applying such asset/liability management
principles, managers will also work within any investment
principles imposed by, for example, the trustees or board. It is
not laissez-faire supervision. On the contrary, it imposes on
supervisors the obligation to ensure that the respective roles of
manager and trustee/custodian/depositary are fulfilled in such
a way as to ensure, in turn, that scheme member's benefits are
secure.
In other words, such distinctly market-oriented
management techniques would allow pension funds to invest a
greater proportion of their assets in a variety of long term
financial instruments such as equities, in line with the
structure of their liabilities. This strategy could increase
returns on the investments of pension funds because these
instruments have generally carried a higher rate of return
than government bonds, and at the same time, they would be
compatible with the free movement of capital and would
encourage the expansion of the E.U. capital market.
However, it must be clear that this freedom to invest in
the assets which the fund managers consider the most
appropriate for their particular pension fund cannot, of course,
be absolute bup should be based on prudential rules and
subject to supervision. The Commission is committed to
ensuring that there is no reduction in the protection of pension
funds. Prudential considerations are all the more important for
equities given the greater volatility of these assets in the short
term. Therefore, the Commission is looking at alternative
methods of supervision that are consistent with the single
market.
Of course, the Green Paper has also stressed the need to
confirm the right of approved investment fund managers to
offer their services in other member states. This would not
only give managers themselves the advantages of a single
market, but the increased competition could be expected to
reduce costs and encourage managers to improve their
performance. The effect would be to increase the returns on
investment, for the benefit of members of pension schemes.
As regards supervision, for the time being, specific E.U.
harmonization rules relating to the investment by pension
funds of their assets do not exist beyond the principle of, and
general rules relating to, the free movement of capital. These
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are intended to guarantee to all investors, including pension
schemes, the freedom to invest where they wish in the E.U.
However, investment restrictions can be imposed if these can
be justified on prudential grounds. Member states may not use
this exception to the freedom as a means of discriminating
against foreign assets, nor as disguised, non-prudential
restrictions introduced for other reasons.
Finally, many member states have restrictive rules that
generally fix the maximum percentage of a fund that can be
held in a particular asset or currency. In this context, the
Commission has the following policy objectives:
* freedom for fund managers who are authorised in accordance with
the Investment Services Directive', the Second Banking Directive'
or the Third Life Insurance Directive4 to offer services all over the
E.U.;
9 freedom to invest assets of pension funds under the "prudent man"
principle; diversification of assets, including diversification into
assets denominated in currencies other than that in which the
liabilities of the institution are established; removal of any
requirements on pension funds to invest in or refrain from investing
in particular categories of assets, nor to localise their assets in a
particular Member State.

The above ideas and, in general, the whole Green Paper
have raised, as expected, many reactions from the various
interested fora but not all of them face the same direction. A
hearing was also held in April, 1998 in this respect. The main
comments have been the following:
* In general, the vast majority of the contributors and, in
particular, the financial sector support the Commission's view
on retirement provision and the E.U. capital markets. A few
member states, trade unions and the representatives of consumer protection associations are more cautious.

2 Council Directive 93/22/EEC of 10 May 1993 Investment Services in the
Securities Field, 1993 O.J. (L 141) 27.
' Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit
of the Business of Credit Institutions, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1 (amending Council
Directive 77/780/EEC, 1977 O.J. (L 322)).
' Council Directive 92/96/EEC of 10 November 1992 Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to Direct Life Assurance, 1992
O.J. (L 360) 1 (amending Council Directive 79/267/EEC, 1979 O.J. (L 283) and
Council Directive 90/619/EEC, 1990 O.J. (L 330)).
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* There is widespread agreement that pension funds and
pension-related life insurance funds will be a major future
growth market. Apart from pension funds and life insurance
companies, banks, building societies, friendly societies, mutual
funds and investment companies are also operating in the
supplementary pension market.
* The financial sector and most of the member states are
opinion that a conservative asset allocation policy conthe
of
centrating on a strategy of fixed income securities (e.g.
government bonds) is not the optimum. In general, it might be
more prudent to invest a substantial part of the asset portfolio
in equities because equities can better meet the long term
nature of the pension liability. Nevertheless, there can be differences in the investment strategy of fund managers due to
differences in the type of pension product they offer (those
involving some elements of life insurance or those which are
"pure" pension products).
e There is widespread agreement with the presentation in
the Green Paper of the role of equities on the return of pension
funds assets. However, a minority asserts that the
Commission's analysis does not deal sufficiently with the uncertainty in the future of continued high yields, in particular
from equities, of funded schemes.
* The majority agree with the analysis of differences in
rate of return between equities and bonds and on the impact
this can have on indirect labour costs and government expenditure. Equity investment is especially regarded as an effective
tool to tackle inflation risks of future pension payments. However, there are some skeptical remarks concerning the high
volatility of equities.
- Most of the parties are in favor of the use of modern asset/liability management ("ALM") techniques in combination
with portfolio diversification. These techniques should be supported by maximum freedom of investment for managers and
trustees. There is also a vast majority against the use of quantitative limits. The role of the supervisory bodies should become more dynamic and more flexible in the future; they
should support the efficiency of the investment process with a
focus on long-term security and capacity of meeting liabilities.
Therefore, the quality of supervision needs to be improved in
order to fulfill its legal mission in the future.
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e All replies stressed that the capital markets within the
E.U. could absorb the expected growth in pension funds assets
and provide sufficient liquidity. The development of European
equity markets will be promoted by the rapid growth of key
technologies/industries such as telecommunication, health care,
financial services and energy. Most parties also expect a rapid
growth of an E.U.-wide corporate bond market, and that EMU
will intensify competition and further economic growth in Europe. However, the pace of development in this field depends
enormously on the abolition of existing investment restrictions.
* There is very broad agreement that pension funds
should be subject to prudential supervision based on the following key requirements: authorisation or approval by a competent authority, criteria for the suitability and approval of
managers, regular reporting and powers of intervention by the
supervisory authority, and rules on the investment of
members' contributions.
e All interested parties agree that if the financial resources available to pension and life assurance funds were to increase, while the supply of government bonds were to decline,
existing restrictions would have a greater impact.
* All contributors endorse the right of fund managers to
offer their services freely throughout the Union. Existing obstacles to this freedom generally appear to be of a cultural,
rather than a legal, nature.
* Views differ sharply, however, as to the interpretation of
the "prudent man" concept and the proper way of diversifying
investments. For some commentators, it is both safer and more
efficient to give managers maximum room for maneuvering so
that they can match their investments most appropriately to
the nature of their liabilities; any fixed quantitative restriction
would, in their view, artificially depress returns. Other interested parties are convinced that only a few fixed rules on the
minimum spread of assets would genuinely guarantee a proper
diversification of the portfolio, and this would not significantly
affect returns. Opinions are rather evenly divided on this question.
* In addition, opinions differ considerably on the question
of the (common or different) prudential rules that should be
applied to pension funds and group life schemes. Some take
the view that the services offered by pension funds and group
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policies are sufficiently similar to be covered by identical rules;
this is, furthermore, the approach already taken in some member states. Others consider that because pension funds, unlike
life assurance companies, do not guarantee the eventual payment of benefits, the risks being assumed by the sponsoring
company or by the employees themselves justify the application of different prudential rules.
* Views, at last, differ as to the instruments that could,
where necessary, enable the prudential rules on pension and
life assurance funds to be adjusted. The difficulty of reaching
agreement between the member states on a directive is
stressed in many contributions. A directive of this nature,
introducing harmonised and sufficiently flexible prudential
rules, is nevertheless repeatedly called for by the financial
sector and considered feasible by some member states. Although there is near unanimity regarding the beneficial effects
which the euro should have on investor freedom, many contributors stress that problems will remain (e.g., "in" and "out"
countries, investment outside the euro area, legal certainty,
etc.).
e A harmonised prudential system designed, above all, to
ensure the financial soundness of schemes must go hand-inhand with a coherent social framework. This must guarantee
workers, throughout their working lives, the continuity of commitments they have been given, without discrimination between workers who stay in their home member state and those
who exercise their right to free movement. The responses demonstrate a broad consensus on the approach taken by the Commission in order to remove barriers to free movement. All respondents welcome the directive on safeguarding the supplementary pension rights of employees and self-employed workers who move within the E.U.,5 which they regard as a first
step in the right direction.
Even if not all the responses have fully endorsed the
Commission's suggestions, the fact that a vast majority of the
interested fora have reacted in a positive way has prompted

' Council Directive 98/49 of 29 June 1998 Safeguarding the Supplementary
Pension Rights of Employees and Self-Employed Workers Who Move Within the
Community, 1998 O.J. (L 209) 1.
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the Commission to start issuing some regulation in order to
achieve the target of a single market for supplementary pensions within a reasonable period of time.
In fact, while there is not yet available a formal proposal
for one or more directives, on May 19, 1998 the commissioner
responsible for financial institutions, Professor Monti announced at the E.U. Council of Ministers of Finance
("ECOFIN") that the Commission is going to issue a communication at the beginning of 1999, based on the conclusions it has
drawn from the above-mentioned consultation.
This initiative also follows the E.U. Finance Ministers'
discussions at their meeting in York in March 1998 and the
identification by the Commission's communication of March
31st on risk capital, where it was stressed that regulatory
restrictions on pension fund investments were a severe distortion within the single market.
According to the Commission, pension funds will play an
important role in the creation of a Pan-European risk capital
market. Smaller and more innovative companies in the fields
of key technology industries such as telecommunications, biotechnology, health care, financial services and energy are
searching for venture capital. In the U.S., the promotion of
investment in venture capital has had very positive effects on
labour markets because of the new jobs created. Therefore, the
implementation of prudential rules to permit pension funds to
invest more easily in risk capital will increase the proportion
of Pan-European equity and should have positive consequences
for European labour markets.
The communication to the E.U. Council, announced by
Commissioner Monti, will provide for an outline of one directive on prudential rules applying to supplementary pension
schemes. The Commission plans to present such a proposal for
a directive in the second half of 1999.
Obviously, it is difficult today to set forth such an outline,
which is still in preparation. However, this Author can try to
present the guiding principles for the preparation of not only
the above-mentioned communication but also of the directive
on harmonized prudential rules in the field of supplementary
pensions which will follow it.
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As its first objective, the future directive will have to ensure that equal pension products will be subject to the same
prudential rules irrespective of whether they are offered by a
pension fund, an insurance company or another financial institution such as a bank.
In addition, the focus should be more on safeguarding supplementary pensions rather than on capital markets: in other
words, capital markets are to serve pension funds, not vice
versa. Security of pensions is a key aim which the Commission
has to take into account. The European Parliament has
stressed many times the necessity of having a regulation which
avoids frauds of the type of Maxwell pension funds.
Another important point is represented by taxation: today
pension funds are taxed in a different way in practically every
member state. This makes the inter-operability of pension
funds, especially for those people who work in different E.U.
countries, very difficult and in some cases even impossible.
The promotion of uniform tax treatment for a specific type of
pension fund is a legitimate objective, but one should be aware
of the difficulties reaching it. Many efforts should be made in
this direction, even if the results might not be those which one
expects. At any rate, one should not forget that the European
Court of Justice, in its case-law, has already taken, on the
basis of the guiding principles of the treaties which rule the
European Union, some positive steps in the direction of single
pension funds across Europe. In this context, one of the problems to be solved is that of portability and transferability of
pensions.
As stated earlier, the modern asset/liability management
techniques are very useful tools in managing the structure of
balance-sheet risks of financial institutions. They can be used
to control risks and manage the investment portfolio and to
ensure that assets are invested in such a way as to reflect the
nature and the duration of the corresponding liabilities. However, a properly functioning asset/liability management is most
effective when based on maximum freedom of investment in
order to fulfill the needs of portfolio diversification according to
risk diversification. Therefore, the future proposal should not
provide for strict quantitative restrictions on certain assets,
especially equities, and currencies like those imposed still
today in several member states.
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It is, of course, obvious that such freedom of investment
has to take into consideration the nature of the pension product, especially when the future pensioner is given a guarantee
for a certain minimum amount of its retirement allowance.
That is why in the future it will be more appropriate to focus
supervisory activities on the products offered rather than on
the pension provider (insurance company or pension fund). The
Commission will examine ways of establishing prudential rules
appropriate to the product so that the same product will be
subject to the same prudential rules, regardless of who will
provide it.
As of today, prudential rules in E.U. member states-such
as fit and proper criteria for managers, solvency requirements
and investment rules-depend upon the nature of the service
provider and not on the service itself. The E.U. harmonized
prudential rules should be more products oriented, even if this
would create an important change, especially for supervisory
authorities. Quality of supervision would have to be improved
in order to play an effective role in ensuring the safety of pension funds.
In this sort of shopping list, some points of the Green Paper have certainly been recognized along with some of the
suggestions of the interested bodies. There are more general
objectives than specific prudential rules. Before reaching an
agreement on such rules, a large number of technical problems
need to be solved in order to achieve, at the same time, a level
playing field between all competitors in the field of supplementary pensions and an efficient supervisory system. It is likely
that some of the existing harmonised prudential rules presently valid for insurance companies will have to be amended in
order to provide for special solvency requirements for some
pension products, both for insurance companies and pension
funds.
As regards the security of pensions and the protection of
pensioners, one has to envisage a sort of safety net on the
basis of similar devices in force in the whole E.U. territory
thanks to particular directives such as the deposits guarantee
scheme (directive of 1994) and the investors protection system
(directive of 1997).
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Finally, this Author must stress that there exist, for the
time being, only several good ideas as to what to do to promote
supplementary pensions in the E.U. We will have to wait for
the official Commission communication in Summer 1999 and,
more particularly, for the proposal of directive which will be
issued later this year in order to have more detailed information as to the future Commission initiative in the field of supplementary pensions.
The only thing which is certain is that there will be such
an initiative in the near future, for the benefit of all the E.U.
people.

